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In this article, the authors assess the current position regarding the debate over article 17 of the OECD 
Model (2010) and whether or not the provision should be amended, or even be considered for removal 
from the OECD Model.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction [1]  
The number and importance of international sporting events are constantly increasing and these are 
generating very significant revenues. Apart from the monster events with worldwide involvement such as the 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, there are other major events that occur on a 
four-year cycle on a worldwide or regional basis such as the Rugby and Cricket World Cups, and the UEFA 
Euro Cup. Annual international circuits in various sports include the tennis Grand Slam and WTP events and 
the motor racing’s F1, and there are an increasing number of leagues and competitions that operate across 
borders, such as the UEFA Champions and Europa Leagues, North American baseball, northern and southern 
hemisphere rugby (Six and Tri Nations, Heineken Cup and Super Rugby), and various golf tournaments and 
tours.  
Equally, entertainers often embark on massive global concert tours, such as Coldplay, Rihanna and U2, and 
major festivals, like Big Day Out, Glastonbury, Pinkpop and Roskilde, attract large audiences, while many 
relatively unknown entertainers regularly perform in other countries.  
Artistes and sportsmen (to use the terminology of the OECD Model (2010) [2] for entertainers and sporting 
stars) who perform internationally are taxed in a special manner. Most countries where a performance occurs 
impose a withholding tax on the fees of artistes and sportsmen, which is permitted by article 17 of the OECD 
Model (2010) that gives the country of performance the right to tax the income of a non-resident artiste or 
sportsman from their activities as such in the country, regardless of whether they are self-employed or 
employees. The article is an exception to the normal rules of articles 7 and 15 of the OECD Model (2010), 
under which income is only taxable in a country other than residence if it is attributable to a permanent 
establishment (PE) in that other country in respect of self employment or after a presence of 183 days in the 
country for employment (if the employer is a non-resident and does not have a PE in that other country which 
bears the payment of the employment income). According to the OECD, [3] the rule can be regarded as an 
anti-avoidance measure to prevent often highly remunerated and mobile artistes and sportsmen paying tax in 
any country, i.e. neither in the source nor residence countries, by various means ranging from artificial tax 
avoidance structures to outright evasion (the non-reporting of income).  
But article 17 also causes problems, especially for not so rich and famous artistes and sportsmen. With the 
OECD permitting gross taxation in the country of performance, [4] the taxable base there is very often much 
higher than the taxable base in the country of residence because the former does not allow deduction of 
expenses of earning the income, whereas the latter usually does. This very often leads to excessive taxation, 
even when the withholding rate is lower than the tax rate in the residence country and double taxation is 
possible because of problems with the application of tax credits in the residence country. [5] These two 
problems can only be prevented by considerable taxpayer compliance and tax administration cost.  
More recently, there have been varied responses to the problems that are elaborated in this article. The 
Netherlands has decided not to tax performance fees at source for artistes and sportsmen resident in treaty 
countries and various major international sports bodies have flexed their negotiating muscles to obtain tax 
exemptions from countries to which major sports events have been awarded. The OECD is also giving new 
attention to article 17. In 2008, [6] it added the option for net taxation in the Commentary and, in April 2010, 
published a Discussion Draft with more proposed changes in the Commentary which formed the basis for the 
2010 International Fiscal Association (IFA)/OECD Seminar E in Rome. [7]  
At the same time, problems continue. Usain Bolt decided not to run the 100 metres at Crystal Palace in 
London in August 2010 and US golf players threatened not to appear at the 2010 Ryder Cup in Wales in 
September 2010 because of high source taxation in the United Kingdom. This article assesses the current 
state of play in the debate over article 17 and whether or not the provision should be given a metaphorical “red 
card” and dismissed from the OECD Model, or at least a “yellow card” and put on notice of a possible sending 
off unless it improves its behaviour.  
 
 
2. The History of Article 17 
 
2.1. Introduction and elaboration 1959/92 
The special tax rules for international taxation of artistes and sportsmen first appeared publicly in 1959 in the 
second report prepared by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and carried over to 
OECD Draft (1963) [8] with the argument that there were “practical difficulties” when applying the normal 
taxing rules to this specific group of taxpayers. [9] Article 17 was extended in OECD Model 1977 [10] with the 
addition of a second paragraph, stating that, when another person (not the artiste or sportsman himself) 
receives the remuneration for the performance, the source country still holds the right to tax the income. This 
gave countries an extra option to tax a “star company”, which are usually set up by top artistes and sportsmen 
in tax havens. The new paragraph was an additional measure to counter tax avoidance.  
More concerns appeared in a 1987 OECD Report, which recommended that the scope of the “star company” 
provision be extended to all legal entities receiving fees for artistic and sports performances. This change duly 
occurred in the next version of the OECD Model (1992), [11] but only through a change in interpretation of the 
existing provision in the Commentary. [12] Accordingly, not only the income of the individual artiste or 
sportsman, but also the profits of every separate legal entity receiving income for the performance are taxable 
in the country of performance, regardless of whether the artiste or sportsman is the owner or a shareholder or 
otherwise has any profit-sharing in the company. This reversal in the Commentary removed any possibility to 
escape from source taxation on performance income. [13] Three countries, Canada, Switzerland and the 
United States, disagree with this reversal. [14] The United States in the US Model (2006) [15] provides special 
language to preserve the previous interpretation. [16] Treaty practice to the same effect is also followed by 
Canada, France and some other countries. Most countries, however, follow the text of the OECD Model and 
with it the Commentary (2010).  
The 1987 OECD Report also noted, as the Commentary does now, that the article does not specify the 
method of taxation in the country of performance and indicated that some states use gross taxation at a low 
tax rate. [17] Furthermore, the OECD recommends the use of the tax credit method for the elimination of 
double taxation when the state of performance does not tax, though the OECD Model was not modified to 
bring this about and the matter was left to negotiation between countries. [18] This approach was adopted by 
many countries, even when they normally apply the exemption method to active income. If the residence 
country still applies the tax exemption method and the country of performance does not use its taxing right or 
restricts this to a low-tax rate on the net income, the result is double non-taxation or very low taxation. [19]  
An important common exception to the general rules of article 17 concerns events supported from public 
funds, such as cultural exchanges. This concern has always been noted in the Commentary and, in 1992, a 
suggested provision was added to the Commentary though on the condition that the exemption “should be 
based on clearly definable and objective criteria to ensure they are given only where intended”. [20] Many 
countries have implemented this approach, some long before 1992, others more recently. [21]  
 
2.2. Analysis, criticism and responses 1992/2010 
After the changes in the Commentary (1992), more attention was directed to article 17 of the OECD Model. 
Sandler (1995) published his standard book following a thorough study of the business and the literature 
around it and in the same year article 17 was also the subject of a seminar at the IFA Congress. [22] 
Furthermore, Betten and Lombardi (1997) demonstrated the complexity of article 17 in triangular situations. 
[23]  
The first real criticism on article 17 was by Grams (1999). [24] He believed that article 17 was not necessary 
and that it could be turned around and changed into a similar provision as for royalties. Still, the country of 
performance should impose a withholding tax under its national tax legislation, but this could be exempted in 
respect of artistes and sportsmen from countries with which bilateral tax treaties were concluded because 
normal taxation would then be secured. He argued that, with a good exemption application procedure in the 
country of performance, the country of residence would be very well aware of the foreign income and be able 
to audit whether or not this was later included in the worldwide income. This approach was followed by 
Nitikman (2001), [25] who provided an overview of the state of non-resident artiste and sportsman taxation in 
the United States and the first introduction of a special clause in the Sweden-United States Income and 
Capital Tax Treaty (1939). [26]  
On more specific issues, the problems with the non-deductibility of expenses under article 17 were discussed 
by Molenaar (2002) [27] who made clear that the difference in the taxable base in the countries of 
performance and residence could easily lead to excessive taxation. He also argued that, within the European 
Union, this might be in breach of the freedom principles of the EC Treaty. [28] The negative effect of the wide 
interpretation of the second paragraph following the Commentary (1992) and the problems facing groups of 
artistes and sportsmen as employees were the subject of a critique by Molenaar and Grams (2002). [29] 
Excessive or even double taxation could be the result of the strict taxing rules following from article 17. One of 
their conclusions was that some of these problems could be removed by options already available in the 
Commentary on Article 17, but that these were not used by countries. Molenaar (2005) carried out an 
extensive survey on the production expenses of performing artistes and came to 75% on average. [30] He 
discussed the problems with obtaining tax credits, and did a survey on the (small) tax revenue from article 17 
in four countries and related this to the relatively high administrative expenses for both the performing artistes, 
the promoters and the tax authorities in two countries. He ended with the same conclusion as Grams and 
Nitikman, which is that article 17 should be removed.  
In 2007, discussions regarding article 17 were held at two conferences. [31] Sandler started the discussion at 
both conferences with his contribution that article 17 was both over and under-inclusive in terms of persons 
and types of income and that he would prefer an extension to all celebrities, including former politicians as 
speakers, sport coaches, film directors, models and such, but also a restriction to earnings of more than, say, 
USD 100,000 per year per country. This would catch only the bigger names with the source tax. Molenaar 
responded that he preferred the full removal of article 17 because it is useless in treaty situations and creates 
the risk of excessive or even double taxation, but could also accept Sandler’s proposal, which follows from a 
new “contribution principle”.  
Court decisions have also indirectly demonstrated problems in the taxation of international income of artistes 
and sportsmen under article 17. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the non-deductibility of 
expenses and exclusion from the use of the normal tax rates for non-resident artistes and sportsmen in 
Germany was not in accordance with the freedom to provide services in the EC Treaty. [32] This no doubt 
influenced the change to the Commentary (2008), offering countries the option between gross and net 
taxation. [33] Two UK court decisions in 2003 and 2006 discussed the endorsement income of tennis players, 
first with three unknown international tennis players and secondly with André Agassi. They had entered into 
endorsement contracts with the manufacturers and resellers of tennis equipment and clothing. The conclusion 
in these cases was that an equivalent part of the worldwide endorsement income also had to be allocated to 
the UK performances. The taxable income of the tennis players was substantially increased. [34] The UK tax 
authorities apply this extensive interpretation to other sports events, such as the London Marathon, 
Wimbledon, the Open Golf Championship, athletic events and the 2010 Ryder Cup in Wales. In 2010, the 
United States followed the UK approach and forced several golf players, such as the South Africans Charles 
Schwartzel and Retief Goosen, [35] to report an equal part of their endorsement in the United States.  
There have been a number of responses to these various issues. The small tax revenue and relatively high 
compliance and administrative costs resulted in the Netherlands adopting the unilateral measure not to use 
the taxing right anymore from 2007 onwards for non-resident artistes and sportsmen resident in countries with 
which the Netherlands has concluded bilateral tax treaties. [36] Figures from the Netherlands tax 
administration from 2003 showed that the tax revenue was a mere EUR 7 million per year, even though the 
option to deduct expenses and file income tax returns was not used by every non-resident artiste and 
sportsman. The unilateral measure was estimated to cost the Netherlands EUR 5 million per year, but it would 
save all parties involved EUR 1.6 million costs per year. This made it a very good trade-off in the Netherlands 
and the non-resident artistes and sportsmen would normally pay income tax in their residence countries, 
under the presumption that the tax credit method is used in the bilateral tax treaty, which was the case in 78 of 
the 90 tax treaties concluded by the Netherlands in 2007. The Netherlands government announced that it 
would start negotiations with the other 12 countries to change the exemption into the credit method. [37] The 
Netherlands removal of its artiste and sportsman withholding tax was welcomed by the artistes and sportsmen 
visiting the Netherlands as a very positive development because it took away much administrative work and 
the risk of double or excessive taxation.  
Major international sporting bodies also entered the fray. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) agreed 
with Canada for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver to exempt the participating sportsmen and national 
teams from source taxation. The IOC had set as a condition for the Olympic bid, after experiences with 
complicated tax issues for participating sportsmen at earlier Olympics, that no source tax should be levied 
from the direct prize monies or the related other earnings, such as sponsoring, advertisement income and 
bonuses from national federations. This was against the Canadian national tax rules, which apply a 15% 
withholding tax on performance income for non-resident sportsmen, with the option to file a normal Canadian 
income tax return at the end of the year, but still the Canadians accepted the exemption for the 2010 Winter 
Olympics. Furthermore, there was no Indian withholding tax for the International Cricket Council World Cup 
Cricket in 2011 and New Zealand gave up its normal 20% withholding tax for the participating national teams 
in the 2011 Rugby World Cup.  
The OECD has not entered these larger debates, but, on 23 April 2010, it published a Discussion Draft for 
changes in the Commentary on Article 17 [38] because of various issues that had been raised about the 
interpretation of the article. In the first place, the OECD with reference to the term “entertainer” instead of 
“artiste” clarifies what in its view falls under article 17, such as the prize money of an amateur and 
advertisements and interviews directly related to entertainment and sports events, but also what falls outside 
the scope of the article, such as the reporting or commenting by an entertainer or sportsman in broadcasting 
who does not participate in the match or tournament. [39] The Discussion Draft also makes it clear that the 
income of the owner of a race car or horse does not fall under article 17 with regard to prize money won and 
that preparation and training come under the “personal activities as such” of entertainers and sportsmen.  
The taxation in two stages in some countries, thereby creating the risk that the non-resident artiste or 
sportsman is taxed twice at source, is noted and it is suggested that such countries should leave out the 
income at the second level. [40] An optional text for competitions with teams from different countries is 
suggested that would exclude source taxation. There are suggested rules to break down income and 
expenses of tours through various countries. The OECD clarifies that prizes and awards paid to national 
federations, associations and leagues fall under the article, but that merchandising and broadcasting income 
only fall under the article when there is direct connection with specific performances, and that this is the same 
for the use of image rights.  
As with other Discussion Drafts, the OECD asked for comments. Ten individuals and organizations 
responded. [41] They gave their practical experience with article 17, raised various problems and suggested 
further improvements or asked for removal of the article.  
 
 
3. Case Studies 
 
3.1. Case 1: football player and team 
 
3.1.1. Facts 
Ron is a football player resident of State R who plays for SOCO, a professional football team established in 
State T. Ron is paid an annual salary of 1 million plus various bonuses based on his performance. His contract 
provides that he must participate in all training sessions and be available to play in all the matches of his club. 
Under a separate agreement between SOCO and RONCO, a company established in State H and wholly-
owned by Ron, SOCO is entitled to use the “image rights” of Ron on a non-exclusive basis. As part of that 
agreement, SOCO pays to RONCO an amount roughly equal to Ron’s salary of 1 million. But, in fact, during 
the period covered by the contract, SOCO makes very limited use of Ron’s image (he appears with all the 
other players in a few team pictures). The league in which SOCO participates includes two teams in State S. 
As a result, SOCO plays four of its 40 games in State S during 2010. SOCO is entitled to a share of the ticket 
sales for each of these matches.  
During the year, Ron is present in State S for 30 working days (out of 200 working days, which include days of 
travel, training and matches): these are 18 days of pre-season training not directly related to a match (out of 
140 days when he trains); eight days of travel and training before and after matches played in State S; and 
four days when he prepares for the four matches played by SOCO in State S, although he actually only plays 
in one of them (he plays in 30 matches during the year).  
While the provisions of all the relevant tax treaties are generally identical to those of the OECD Model, article 
17 of the State S-State T Tax Treaty includes the following additional paragraph (the “league provision”):  
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the income of: 
a) an athlete in respect of his activities as an employee of a team which participates in a league with 
regularly scheduled games in both Contracting States; or  
b) a team described in subparagraph a).  
 
3.1.2. Taxation of Ron’s salary in State S 
Ron’s taxation in State S with regard to the salary relies at first on the relevant domestic law of such State. If 
State S were the United Kingdom, for example, the salary payments of Ron would be taxed in the proportion 
of 30:200, where 30 is the number of days spent by Ron in State S for purposes related to the performance 
there. This taxation is consistent with the State R-State S Tax Treaty as proposed to be interpreted by the 
OECD.  
From a Swiss perspective, the situation appears to be rather different. In a similar situation, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, i.e. the Swiss Supreme Court (Tribunal fédéral), [42] denied the application of article 17 of the 
Netherlands-Switzerland Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1951). [43] The case dealt with a professional 
cyclist, resident in (and national of) Switzerland, employed by a Netherlands team participating in races all 
over Europe, including the Netherlands. The issue was whether or not the salary attributable to races in States 
other than Switzerland and the Netherlands (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) was taxable in 
Switzerland. This case (the “cyclist case”) raises many of the issues covered in the draft OECD proposal to 
amend the Commentary on Article 17. The Court then looked at the Netherlands-Switzerland Income and 
Capital Tax Treaty (1951) and recognized that the person had to be considered a sportsman under article 17 
of the tax treaty. The question was, however, whether or not there was a sufficient link between the salary 
related to races in third States and the activity of the sportsman as such. The Supreme Court ruled, in 
essence, that the income from third countries was not sufficiently linked with a specific performance, including 
training, in those countries. The Court took an opposite approach to what the Discussion Draft suggests and 
affirmed that, in the case at issue, there was a mere indirect link that made article 17 not applicable. The 
Supreme Court, instead, upheld the application of article 15 of the tax treaty. According to this provision, 
however, the Swiss Court concluded that, as the cyclist was not present in any of the third states for a period 
of longer than 183 days, Switzerland had an exclusive right to tax the salary attributable to races in third 
states. The “cyclist case” shows how the Swiss case law favours a very restrictive application of article 17, 
based on the existence of a direct link between the salary and the performance.  
A different approach, which is more consistent with the OECD Discussion Draft, was upheld in Netherlands 
case law. Three recent decisions dealt with the exemption in the Netherlands with regard to a portion of the 
salary referred to a performance held abroad. [44] The Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) adopted an 
approach consistent with that taken in the United Kingdom. The reasoning of the Netherlands Court was the 
following: at the time the contract was agreed the parties already knew about the performances abroad and 
there was no additional payment for such performances; the salary would, therefore, have been paid even if 
there was no competition at all. The link between the performance and salary was strong enough to attribute 
part of the salary to the performances abroad. In determining the income to be considered foreign sourced 
(and, therefore, exempt in the Netherlands), the Court affirmed that days of training, stand by in the foreign 
country, travelling and necessary stay had be taken into account insofar as they were all related to the 
performance abroad. In one of the three cases, the Court also clarified that, in the absence of a sportive 
performance, performing at a press conference or promoting the name of a sponsor had to be considered 
activities falling within the scope of article 17.  
Unlike Switzerland, both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom appear to comply with what the OECD 
Discussion Draft suggests: article 17 should also extend to income from third states and, in determining the 
amount of such income, preparation and training days must be taken into account, being days to be regarded 
as working days.  
So far as the proposed OECD Commentary provides for taxing training days in a state which are not linked to 
a particular performance there (apart from the training itself), the history of article 17 suggests that this goes 
beyond the original intention which was only to confer taxing rights where there was a public performance 
(which was not used in the sense of the performance involved in training). Once annual salaries not directly 
linked to specific performances are involved, however, as is nowadays common, apportionment necessarily 
becomes an issue and the sensible approach seems to be to use a method based on days of presence. 
Omitting training days in a state not associated with a performance effectively allocates those days to the state 
of residence under such an apportionment approach, depending on the accident of whether particular training 
is associated with a performance in the state.  
 
3.1.3. The application of the “league provision” to Ron 
Canada is one of the few countries that has included in (some of) its tax treaties the “league provision”; this 
provision provides that article 17 will: (1) neither apply to the income of an athlete member of a team 
(participating regularly in scheduled games taking place in the two contracting states); nor (2) to the income of 
the team itself. This provision is intended to provide some administrative ease and certainty; the provision 
assumes that the members of the team are resident in the same country where the team is established. 
However, in reality, this is increasingly not the case, just as in Case 1, where Ron is resident of State R and is 
employed by a team established in State T.  
In paragraph 14.1 of the OECD Discussion Draft, [45] the OECD has proposed an alternative provision, with 
similar effects to the league provision included in the State S-State T Tax Treaty, although the provision does 
not cover triangular situations.  
State T, therefore, does not obtain additional taxing rights over Ron under the league provision. It applies 
article 17 of the State R-State T Tax Treaty and, therefore, it would only tax the income from Ron’s 
employment activities exercised therein, taking into account the working days spent in State D, which also 
include training days, days of travel as well as the days of the matches.  
 
3.1.4. Taxation of bonuses and image rights 
Performance bonuses should be treated like salary as far as the apportionment is concerned, unless a 
particular bonus payment is related to a specific event, such as scoring a goal in a particular football match.  
Some tax treaties contain specific provisions dealing with bonuses: the Canada-United States Income and 
Capital Tax Treaty (1980), [46] for example, has a special rule on signing bonuses (also known as 
“inducement bonuses”). The provision states:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles XIV ... and XV ... (Dependent personal services) an amount paid by 
a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State as an inducement to sign an 
agreement relating to the performance of the services of an athlete (other than [salary]) may be taxed in the 
first-mentioned State, but the tax so charged shall not exceed 15 per cent of the gross amount of such 
payment.  
These types of bonuses are paid prior to the performance and they, therefore, raise the issue of whether or 
not they are related to performance. In particular, the signing bonus is linked to a future performance, and, 
therefore, before actual performance takes place. The signing bonuses may be paid directly to the sportsman 
(such as in the US sport leagues) or be paid as transfer fees to the team (as in European and Latin American 
countries). When such bonuses are not paid directly to the sportsmen, the issue is which part of the payment 
ultimately reaches the performer.  
On the other hand, with regard to the taxation of payments for image rights, it must be remarked that, in the 
case under discussion, Ron’s team made little use of such rights. Such payments are often considered a 
disguised remuneration: in many countries, for example, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, they 
would likely be treated as remuneration and taxed in accordance with article 17(1) and (2). (The fact that the 
payment is to RONCO rather than Ron is taken up subsequently.)  
From a Swiss perspective, the taxation of the image rights depends on whether Switzerland is the state of 
residence of Ron or of the “star company”. In the first case, the issue would be the recognition of the 
company. In the second case, the issue would be whether or not the “star company” does have actual 
substance, taking into account also the abuse of law doctrine. Should the “star company” be considered a 
mere fiduciary, i.e. an entity with no actual substance, Switzerland would ignore the existence of the company 
and would tax the non-resident sportsman in respect of the income derived from the image right.  
Whether or not payments made for the use of image rights should be regarded as a form of disguised 
remuneration, however, still remains a doubtful issue. During Seminar E, the panellists gave some examples. 
What if the organizer of a tennis tournament pays a famous tennis player for the right to use her picture on 
posters to advertise tournament in which she plays? Promoting the tournament is clearly related to the 
performance, and, therefore, no doubts should arise about the application of article 17.  
What if a soccer team pays one of its famous soccer players for the right to use his picture on a team 
calendar? This case raises some more doubts, as the link with the performance is more remote than in the 
previous case; only in a broad sense would it be possible to argue that the remuneration is related to the 
games that the soccer player plays in the season.  
What if a videogame producer pays a soccer player to use his picture in a video game? In this case, the 
remuneration would likely be unrelated to performance by the player in particular countries, but, rather, related 
to the reputation or the fame of the player. Article 17 should, therefore, not be applicable in such case.  
Finally, it is worth noting that in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2010 issued a 
“General Legal Advice Memorandum” on endorsement income. The IRS pointed out that in many cases the 
incremental value to the player, if any, is rather marginal, for example, when the right to use his or her name 
and likeness rights is not valuable on a stand-alone basis. Accordingly, retainer fees paid under such 
contracts should be characterized as income from personal services and, to the extent that the fees are 
related to services performed in the United States, taxed on a net basis at graduated rates. Vice versa, in the 
atypical situation, in which a player can establish that the sponsor retained the player to use his or her name 
and likeness rights on a stand-alone basis, for example, to market a signature line of equipment, a portion of 
the retainer fees may be characterized as royalties or, depending on the facts, may be effectively connected 
with the conduct of that player’s US trade or business.  
 
3.1.5. Taxation of SOCO and RONCO in State S 
Due to the existence of the league provision included in the State S-State T Tax Treaty, article 17 would not 
be applicable to the team that is a resident enterprise of State T (as noted previosuly, this tax treaty does not 
apply to Ron as he is resident in a third state, i.e. State R). Accordingly, article 7 would apply to the income of 
the team from the games in State S, thereby preventing this income from being taxed in State S in the 
absence of a PE of SOCO in State S. In the case of a tax treaty similar to the OECD Model (lacking the 
league provision), would the team be taxable under article 17? The provision refers to artistes and sportsmen, 
but the Commentary since 1992 has made clear that article 17(2) includes the team. [47]  
This approach is generally shared by the OECD Member countries; for example, if the Netherlands were State 
S, there would be no doubt about the application of article 17 to the team as such. [48]  
An additional issue related to the taxation of the team, is constituted by the possible double taxation that might 
arise when the team and the sportsmen are taxed with regard to the same profit element. In this regard, the 
OECD Discussion Draft suggests that the team should not be taxed on the payments that are passed on the 
entertainer or the sportsmen so as to avoid the application of article 17(2) resulting in double taxation of the 
same income. The Commentary, however, recognizes that it may be too difficult to allocate the remuneration 
to the team members, thereby suggesting in this case the taxation of the team.  
In this respect, it is worth mentioning the reservation of Canada, Switzerland and the United States, according 
to which the application of article 17(2) should be targeted to tax avoidance arrangements and the provision in 
the United States Model effectively limiting it to “star companies”.  
The approach envisaged in the OECD Discussion Draft is adopted in the United Kingdom, for example, to 
prevent the application of article 17(2) to cause possible double taxation problems when the team and the 
sportsmen are taxed with regard to the same profit element.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, if State S were Switzerland and the team was a jazz or a rock band, 
Switzerland would tax the promoter who has the domestic tax liability on the payment to the band. There is a 
pending controversy with a somewhat similar reasoning for the organizer of a football match.  
With regard to RONCO which is resident in State H, article 17(2) of the State S-State H Tax Treaty would 
apply according to the current OECD Commentary. [49] The OECD Discussion Draft does not propose any 
change to this position. The issue of whether or not the image rights income paid to RONCO is attributable to 
the performance has been discussed previously.  
 
3.1.6. The future of article 17 
It is apparent from this case study that taxation involves considerable difficulties and that states may well 
disagree on how various issues are to be handled. As noted previosuly, issues of these kinds have led the 
Netherlands to abandon the exercise of its taxing rights under article 17 in respect of residents of treaty 
countries, with little apparent cost to revenue and considerable saving of compliance costs to taxpayers.  
The Netherlands has, in effect, given article 17 a red card and this raises the question of whether or not other 
countries should do likewise. It was pointed out, however, with an example of the Swiss lump-sum taxation 
system for certain wealthy foreigners, that the abandonment of source taxation in favour of residence taxation 
may lead to a (further) migration of entertainers and sportsmen subject to article 17 to such low tax countries 
with a suitable treaty network.  
Well-intentioned changes to source taxation can have unexpected effects. Shipping companies which are 
taxed on a residence only basis in most countries have long since migrated to shipping havens and most 
developed countries have had to introduce tonnage taxes (effectively little tax at all) to get their shipping 
industries back again. Would the same result occur if article 17 is removed from the OECD Model?  
 
 
3.2. Case 2: the big international tournament 
 
3.2.1. Facts 
State S has been awarded the organization of the 2013 tournament of WIFAA, an international federation 
established in State R, which is the world governing body for a major sport. Sixteen teams from various 
countries will participate in that tournament. The Local Organizing Committee (LOC) and State S have 
contractually agreed that State S would set-up de facto tax free-zones around WIFAA designated sites where 
the tournament will take place (a condition for hosting the tournament). In each of these zones, WIFAA and its 
subsidiaries as well as all the foreign teams will be exempt from all income taxes, customs duties and VAT. In 
these zones, WIFAA commercial subsidiaries, its licensees, merchandise partners and service providers will 
be exempt from income taxes on their profits. It has been agreed, however, that VAT will be paid on tickets 
sold by the LOC, but not on the tickets given to WIFAA. Subject to the applicable laws and tax treaties, all 
non-resident players will pay tax on salaries and prizes derived from their participation in the tournament, 
except on the prizes awarded by WIFAA.  
WIF-TV, the wholly-owned broadcasting subsidiary of WIFAA, which is a resident of State R, has sold the 
rights to broadcast the tournament matches in State S to SCC, a company resident of State S. In 
consideration for these rights, SCC will pay WIF-TV a significant lump-sum amount and will provide, free of 
charge to WIFAA and the LOC, 500 advertising slots for WIFAA events and the tournament. WIF-TV has 
entered into similar contracts with broadcasters in a number of different countries; these agreements provide 
that the live feed for each match of the tournament will be provided by WIF-TV through its host broadcaster. 
Around 50% of the money derived by WIF-TV from the granting of the broadcasting rights will be distributed to 
the teams that will compete in the tournament and 30% will go to the LOC. Each foreign broadcaster that has 
secured broadcasting rights will send its commentators and journalists to State S for periods ranging from a 
few weeks to several months. These commentators and journalists, who are often former athletes and famous 
members of teams that did not qualify for the tournament, will travel across the country to broadcast the 
matches and to provide interviews and reports before and after these matches.  
 
3.2.2. Payments for broadcasting rights 
With regard to payments for broadcasting rights the OECD Discussion Draft provides new suggested 
Commentary as follows: 
9.4 Payments for the simultaneous broadcasting of a performance by an entertainer or sportsman made 
directly to the performer or for his benefit (e.g. a payment made to the star-company of the performer) fall 
within the scope of Article 17 (see paragraph 18 of the Commentary on Article 12, which also deals with 
payments for the subsequent sales or public playing of recordings of the performance). Where, however, 
the payment is made to a third party (e.g. the owner of the broadcasting rights) and that payment does 
not benefit the performer, the payment is not related to the personal activities of the performer and 
therefore does not constitute income derived by a person as an entertainer or sportsman from his 
personal activities as such. For example, where the organiser of a football tournament holds all 
intellectual property rights in the event and, as such, receives payments for broadcasting rights related to 
the event, Article 17 does not apply to these payments; similarly, Article 17 will not apply to any share of 
these payments that will be distributed to the participating teams. Whether such payments will constitute 
royalties covered by Article 12 will depend, among other things, on the legal nature of such broadcasting 
rights, in particular under the relevant copyright law.  
With regard to broadcasting rights, the observation by Germany in the Commentary on Article 17) is 
noteworthy: 
15. ... Germany, considering paragraph 18 of the Commentary on Article 12, takes the view that payments 
made as remuneration for live broadcasting rights of an event are income of the performing or appearing 
sportspersons or artistes under paragraph 1 of Article 17. This income may be taxed in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of Article 17 in the case of payments made to any other third party in the context of an 
economic exploitation of the live broadcasting rights.  
It is to be noted that the proposed new Commentary leaves open the question whether or not such payments 
are royalties – if not, presumably they will be business profits or other income. This matter is important 
because of the common treaty practice of permitting tax on royalties at source even though this is not the 
position in the OECD Model. In a number of countries it is considered that if the organizer running the event 
never owns the copyright, but, rather, the copyright vests initially in the broadcaster, then payments to the 
organizer cannot be payments for copyright. The payment in effect is simply for access to the venue and 
permission for the broadcaster to make a recording of the event in which the broadcaster holds the copyright. 
There are cases in India coming to that conclusion and in Australia the tax administration has given up claims 
in some cases that the payments are royalties.  
Some countries seek to clarify this issue in treaties (with if necessary supporting rules in domestic law). For 
instance, under the Mexico-Russia Income Tax Treaty (2004), [50] the term “royalties... includes payments of 
any kind as consideration for the reception of, or the right to receive, visual images or sounds, or both, 
transmitted to the public by satellite or by cable, optic fibre or similar technology, or the use in connection with 
television broadcasting or radio broadcasting”. Australia has similar provisions in domestic law and recent tax 
treaties, but it is still considered by many Australian advisers that the provisions do not catch the payment by 
the broadcaster to the organizer of the sporting (or entertainment) event. Rather, the provisions are dealing 
with cable TV and the like generally and deal with payments by the cable broadcaster for content to the 
copyright owner or another broadcaster. The matter may be tested in litigation in Australia in the near future.  
 
3.2.3. Special exemptions 
The recent tendency of international sporting organizations to flex their negotiation muscles in choosing the 
location of major sporting events has already been noted. These were not isolated examples but reflect a 
growing trend. With regard to the 2012 Olympics Games, the United Kingdom has introduced a special tax 
regime that provides for many exemptions in favour of the London organizing committee, the competitors and 
the entourage. The exemptions extend to income tax, capital gains tax and corporation tax, but not to VAT.  
In the Netherlands, similar issues were raised with regard to the 2018 FIFA World Cup that the Netherlands 
proposed it would organize together with Belgium. There was an intense public debate, but, ultimately, it was 
decided that the conditions demanded by the FIFA were too onerous.  
Similar issues arose in Brazil, where legislation was enacted to cover the fiscal periods 2013 and 2014 on the 
occasion of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The same was also true in South Africa for both the 2009 
Confederation Cup and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It is not so much the taxation of the organizing entity that 
counts, such an entity being a non-profit organization. What is relevant is the scope of the exemptions that 
covers import taxes, excise taxes for the organizing entity and its subsidiaries, royalties, and credit and 
insurance transactions. In Brazil, for example, the exemption has been extended to referees, although this 
does not cover other Brazilian-source income.  
In Europe, some of the tax issues have been sidestepped by other means. In the matches in the UEFA 
Champions or Europa League football, the tournaments are organized so that every home club keeps its own 
box office earnings and does not pay anything to the visiting foreign clubs. Accordingly, in the UEFA 
competitions there is no taxable foreign performance income under article 17 of the OECD Model for the 
participating football clubs. Furthermore, UEFA collects the revenue from the TV rights, a portion of which is 
paid to the participating clubs, based on their results and size of their home state. If these payments fall under 
article 12 of the OECD Model (discussed previously), which allocates the taxing right to the residence state, 
there is no risk of excessive or even double taxation in respect of competitions as source taxation is 
eliminated.  
This differs from the finals for the Champions League and Europa League, which are played on independent 
soil (not the home country of either finalist). In 2011, the Champions League final was at Wembley stadium in 
London and the Europa League final was in the Dublin arena. The box office earnings for these finals are 
shared by the two clubs and the UEFA, which means that the state where the final is held can levy tax if the 
finalists are non-residents. Due to pressure from the UEFA, however, the United Kingdom gave up its 
withholding tax in regard to the Champions League final. Ireland did not levy any tax with regard to the Europa 
League final, as there is no domestic withholding tax provision applicable to non-resident sportsmen and 
artistes. This means that, although the United Kingdom normally levies a 20% withholding tax, subject to a 
right to deduct expenses at source and an optional income tax settlement at the end of the year, the teams of 
the Champions League final in 2011 received their gross fees free from any deduction and pay tax (if any) in 
their residence state.  
With regard to the UEFA Euro Cup for national teams, which, in 2012, is to be held in Poland and Ukraine, 
UEFA has also forced both organizing states to allow an exemption for the 24 participating national teams.  
 
3.2.4. More erosion of article 17 
Even where countries seek to tax income produced by sporting events, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
do so because of the negotiating might of major international sporting organizations. For sporting 
organizations that lack such negotiating strength, there are other avenues available to produce similar 
outcomes. The result often is that many highly paid sports stars manage to avoid tax in the country of 
performance, while lower paid sportspersons may not, even though in the latter case the cost of collection and 
compliance may exceed the revenue collected.  
Highly paid entertainers do not as yet seem to have achieved the negotiating position of the sporting 
organizations, but even in this area by other means (such as generous tax concessions and transfer 
payments), the people behind the entertainers like large film studios have managed to improve their tax and 
financial position at the expense of states, which no doubt allows them to pay higher amounts to the 
entertainers.  
 
 
3.3. Case 3: the tennis player 
 
3.3.1. Facts 
Renée is a famous tennis player resident of State R. One of the 20 tournaments in which Renée participates 
in 2010 takes place in State S (she wins that tournament). Under a sponsorship contract with HCO, resident of 
State T, Renée is paid 600,000 per year for wearing HCO’s trade mark and trade name on her tennis shirts 
during tennis tournaments, including in matches and interviews. In addition, bonus payments are made by 
HCO for each tournament in which she reaches the final. In a period of six months during which Renée 
recovers from an injury, she derives the following income: (1) 100,000 for a public speech in State S to an 
audience of 5,000 persons who attend a major conference; (2) 50,000 to participate in a televised fashion 
show, which is recorded in State S, but is broadcasted worldwide, in which she models HCO’s clothes; and (3) 
50,000 to assist the play-by-play commentator during the broadcast of a tennis tournament in State S.  
 
3.3.2. Endorsement income 
The OECD Discussion Draft proposes changes to the Commentary to allocate endorsement income to the 
place of performance based on the number of tournaments, regardless of their relative importance. An 
interesting similar case arose in Canada concerning the famous singer Sting (Gordon M. Sumner), who was 
resident in the United Kingdom. [51] He performed concerts in Canada under contract with a US company 
(Roxanne). Sting reported limited income from performances in Canada based on days in Canada during the 
concert tour. The Court ruled that Sting’s income had to be allocated on reasonable basis. Specifically, it held 
that the gross revenue from concerts was a reasonable basis (more or less an apportionment based on the 
number of concerts in Canada out of the total number of concerts, similar to the per tournament basis).  
The OECD Discussion Draft does not discuss whether or not the new approaches of the United Kingdom and 
the United States towards endorsement income discussed previously is in line with article 17 of the OECD 
Model. [52] Both countries apply their taxing rights extensively, even on endorsement income that is not being 
paid by an entity in the state or to a resident of the state. But tax courts in both states have confirmed this 
approach in the Agassi [53] and Goosen [54] cases.  
 
3.3.3. The cult of celebrity 
With regard to the treaty treatment of the payment for the public speech, the proposed changes to the 
Commentary address the issues as follows:  
The payment for the public speech does not fall within Article 17; paragraph 3 of the OECD Commentary on 
Article 17 makes clear that this provision “... does not extend to a visiting conference speaker (e.g. a former 
politician who receives a fee for a speaking engagement...)”.  
With regard to the payment for the fashion show, the issue of whether or not such a payment is covered by 
article 17 is more uncertain. The Commentary on Article 17 (2010) affirms that the provision “... does not 
extend ... to a model performing as such (e.g. a model presenting clothes during a fashion show or photo 
session...)”; it is, therefore, very likely that the payment in question falls outside the scope of the provision.  
The same conclusion is true in regard to the payment as a sport commentator, which is clearly outside article 
17. [55]  
Endorsement payments and the public speaking and similar spinoffs for entertainers and sports stars relate as 
much to their celebrity status as to any performance. True it is that the celebrity status starts from the sporting 
or entertainment performances (and in this regard the proposed new Commentary makes clear the 
participants in reality TV shows are within article 17), but celebrity quickly takes on a life of its own. A patch on 
a tennis shirt worn during a tournament clearly relates to the sporting performance, but is the same true for a 
watch that is taken off during the match, or underwear designed by the sports star (even if worn on the court)?  
 
3.3.4. Familiar shortfalls of article 17 
The situations highlighted by this case study cover fairly familiar territory even though there is some additional 
commentary proposed by the OECD. Article 17 has always seemed to come up short (at least since payments 
relate more to celebrity than anything else). Activity as a celebrity is activity as a sports star or entertainer, and 
payments generated by celebrity often do not relate to activity as a sports star or entertainer.  
 
 
4. Red Card, Yellow Card or As it Is, Article 17? 
The discussion of the case studies reveal that article 17 of the OECD Model causes many practical problems, 
such as: (1) when is the artiste performing; (2) how should the salary be attributed when the performances 
relate to different countries; (3) should the income be taxed on a gross basis; and (4) how can tax credit 
problems be avoided? Furthermore, the application of article 17 produces administrative and compliance costs 
that may be ultimately higher than the tax revenue derived from the taxation of the artistes and sportsmen, 
especially when the withholding tax from non-residents and tax credits for residents are balanced.  
In EU Member States, the taxation of artistes has also raised several issues of conflicts with EU law. This has 
led the Netherlands to review its system of taxing the artistes and sportsmen; the Netherlands system is 
currently limited to persons resident in non-treaty countries, although this may obviously raise issues of double 
non-taxation. This approach has also been adopted with regard to major sports events, such as the Olympics, 
the UEFA Champions League Final, and the EURO Championships, and the Cricket and Rugby World Cups.  
The panel members of Seminar E at the 2010 IFA Congress had varying responses. At least one expressed 
an opinion in favour of removing article 17 because of the many problems and the administrative burdens. 
Other panellists were more ambivalent, preferring to retain the article, but willing to make amendments, such 
as a threshold as in the US Model (2006), exemptions for cultural groups, teams in league competitions and, 
especially, employees. One panel member (tongue firmly in cheek and clearly desiring to be sent off) wanted 
to retain the article as is because of the lucrative fees it generates for advisers. The chair of the panel 
expressed doubts about article 17 because of the problems noted previously and the fact that, when more 
money was at stake at big sports events, the source tax was removed.  
The panel provided two examples from 2010 to demonstrate the special attention high-profile artistes and 
sportsmen have in the media. The first [56] was the triple Olympic champion Usain Bolt, who decided not to 
compete at August 2010’s Aviva London Grand Prix because of the United Kingdom’s tax laws. The second 
[57] was the “Black Stars” football team from Ghana, which reached the quarterfinals at the 2010 World Cup in 
South Africa. Ghana’s Internal Revenue Service demanded tax payments of about USD 349,000 on the 
earnings of the members of the national soccer team, which reportedly represented 10% of the total income of 
the team members. [58]  
Whatever its specific issues, the chair noted that article 17 is a very special and distinctive measure amongst 
different types of services. This group of taxpayers very often develop a high value in a short period of time, 
but the special tax rules create a discussion about fairness versus envy and power. The risk of excessive or 
double taxation is likely, while the tax revenue from the special taxing rules is limited. He stressed the 
importance of net taxation to make the special taxing rules fairer and underlined the problems with 
identification and apportionment. Finally, he believed that no special taxing rules should be given to a specific 
group of taxpayers, but that general principles should be implemented in the taxation of high value services 
generally. In devising such principles, it is necessary to balance a variety of competing considerations. 
Exclusive residence taxation may lead to the shift of high-value service providers to convenient havens. But 
source taxation can be overdone and probably currently applies to many of the people captured by article 17. 
The conclusion is that the current application of article 17, as for services generally, is a mess, but cleaning it 
up is not a simple task. [59]  
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